Practices and meanings of non-professional stock-trading in Taiwan : a case of relational work by Chen, Yu-Hsiang & Roscoe, Philip John
1Practices and meanings of non-professional stock-
trading in Taiwan: a case of relational work
Yu-Hsiang Chen, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan
Philip Roscoe, University of St Andrews (corresponding author)
yuhsiangchen@hotmail.com, pjr10@st-andrews.ac.uk
Introduction
The stock market in Taiwan enjoys a remarkably high level of participation from
nonprofessional or lay-investors, with 87 brokerage accounts per hundred of population.
What kind of factors might account for its popularity? Moreover, what kind of languages,
discourses, and calculative strategies can be mobilized by lay investors, as they pursue
investment opportunities, reap profits and deal with the inevitable losses? The persistence of
non-professional investors in the face of continued financial underperformance has long
puzzled researchers in finance (De Bondt, 1998, 2005). While sociological explanations for
investor activity have begun to emerge in the Anglo-Saxon context, Taiwanese investors
remain relatively under-researched.
As is well-known, since the 1980s the ‘new’ economic sociology has offered a variety of
structural explanations for economic activity based on networks, social relationships, and
structural holes, all loosely governed by the term ‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1973;
Swedberg & Granovetter, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). At the same time, researchers have become
aware of the limitations of structural, network-based approaches, and particularly the one-
dimensional nature of their explanatory mechanisms, mostly in the shape of ‘weak ties’.
Arguing that sociology should concentrate on the nature, content and making of these same
network relations, Zelizer writes that ‘Once we agree with the premise that economic
transactions are fundamentally social interactions, the search is on for a better theory of social
process to account for economic activity’ (Zelizer, 2012). Such attention to cultural
structures, for example, requires thick description and case study rather than parsimonious
abstraction. In Europe, even ‘culture’ remains too amorphous an explanation (Callon, 1998)
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calculation, the performative consequences of theory, and practices of valuation. As a result,
a substantial ‘anthropology of calculation’ literature has sought to show how market
participants come to make decisions, understanding them as embedded, not in one-
dimensional social relations, but complex networks of device, theory and human which share
and configure the burden of calculative activity (Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Muniesa, Millo, &
Callon, 2007). However, as the workshop call suggests, studies of calculation have tended to
concentrate on high finance and on the professional: the hedge fund manager, the trader, the
corporate executive (Beunza, Hardie, & MacKenzie, 2006; Cabantous, Gond, & Johnson-
Cramer, 2010; Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007). One possible exception here is the growing
literature on non-professional investors in the Anglo Saxon world, where the calculative
strategies of a distinctly low-finance, amateur occupations have received some attention
(Harrington, 2007; Preda, 2009a; Roscoe & Howorth, 2009).
It may also be argued that this new, new economic sociology’s focus on the material and
theoretical embeddedness of calculation neglects the context and nature of the social relations
that surround any decision. Pursuing an alternative route in developing a newer economic
sociology, Zelizer (1994, 2012) argues that economic life is a vehicle for social relations.
Monetary arrangements, for example, represent and transform social life, and establishing
monetary distinctions, (‘earmarking’ money) is a form of relational work. Zelizer (2012) cites
Randall Collins’ argument that the structure of social class is produced by various circuits of
money used to enact specific social relations. Pierre Bourdieu (2005) also argues that
economic action is part of the reproduction of status and power, while Preda (2009b) draws
attention to status groups and charismatic authority as a source of power and legitimacy in
financial markets.
In this paper we present an empirical analysis of non-professional investors in Taiwan based
on 38 interviews with lay investors. Our analysis develops these themes of social capital,
education and family wealth through a ‘relational sociology’ to show that social relations are
embedded within stock investing, and that the context and practices of everyday economic
life are constitutive of lay-investment in Taiwan. As befits a more ‘collective’ society
(Hofstede, 1983) economic decisions are closely bound up in social relations. We show that
the languages and practices of lay-investment locate it within the domestic sphere and within
the family, and the economic connotations of the activity are contested and negotiated within
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suggest that trading money is often separated from, and earmarked as less important than,
other kinds of money despite the often severe personal consequences of taking up stock-
trading. Our study contributes to the growing recognition that mundane social relations must
be written into the sociology of economic activity (Moor & Lury, 2011).
Our analysis may also serve to answer questions raised by existing research on Taiwanese
investors, which has shown that as a class of investor they do not enjoy great economic
rewards from their trading. Using transaction data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Barber
et al. (Brad M Barber, Lee, Liu, & Odean, 2007)indicate that most lay investors incur
substantial losses from their aggressive trading strategies, and within the population of the
most active individual traders (day traders), less than 1% of them is able to make stable and
reasonable profits. Barber et al. note that the turnover rate of the Taiwan Stock Exchange is
unusually high, averaging 292% annually during 1995-9, and suggest that this turnover is due
to lay investors’ excessive trading. They argue the excessive trades are motivated by
psychological characteristics: overconfidence and sensation seeking. In general, Taiwanese
men trade more actively than women, and women are more reluctant than men to realize
losses. These findings are consistent with Barber and Odean’s (2001) study of lay investors in
the US, except that there are slightly more female than male investors in Taiwan’s stock
market (Kuo, Kuo, Chiu and Fan 2005; (Brad M. Barber, Lee, Liu, & Odean, 2009). Lee
(2012) mentions that Taiwanese women are more willing to participate in the stock market or
invest mutual funds than men. These findings raise questions about motivation for
investment, longevity of investment, and gender approaches to investment that may be
expanded by qualitative empirical data.
Our paper will first of all review the literature of economic embeddedness and relational
sociology, as well as briefly considering European approaches to calculation and valuation.
We will then discuss data collection, present an analysis of relational work among Taiwanese
non-professional investors, and conclude with a discussion.
4Economic exchange and social relations
The ‘new’ economic sociology locates economic action within the structures of social
relations, or ‘social networks’. An individual's social network usually is seen as a
composition of both ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973; Swedberg &
Granovetter, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). ‘Strong ties’ refer to connections with family members, close
friends and intimate relatives. By contrast, ‘weak ties’ indicate an individual’s more distant
connections with, for example, colleagues or business conterparties. Some scholars focus on
a complete network depiction, made up of the social ties within a ‘closed’ community, such
as a company, and emphasize the characteristics of different ‘cliques’ and ‘nodes’ (individual
people) in this network. For example, Burt (1992) proposed the concept of ‘structural holes’
to refer to the strategic advantage of the ‘node’ that has ties between ‘near-closure’ groups.
He argues this ‘node’ is similar to a ‘broker’ and would earn benefits by ‘brokering’
information between these two groups.
The ‘resources’ available in a person’s social network are termed ‘social capital’. These
‘resources’ include tangible items, such as economic capital, and intangible items, such as
information, advice and enforceable trust. The money people borrow through their social ties
tends to be easier or less expensive (that is, with a lower interest rate) than from formal
financial organizations, such as banks, as trust between lenders and borrowers, based on their
strong social connections, can reduce the cost and risk of transactions (Coleman 1988). In
particular, borrowing money through social relations seems popular in many immigration and
ethnic minority communities. The communities tend to have strong solidarity and interior
sanctions, and the community members are more likely to be rejected by outside financial
organizations than mainstream society members (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).
Relationships between social capital and economic activity are not one-directional. Paromita
Sanyal’s (2009) study of microfinance programmes for women in Indian rural areas show
how social capital may be generated from economic relations. Social ties were developed
within the members of these credit groups through interactions in regular meetings,
information sharing and participation in annual conventions, and one third of these groups
undertook collective actions such as stopping domestic violence against women, acquiring
public goods and supporting anti-liquor campaigns in the communities.
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participation in the stock market increases alongside household wealth and education (e.g.
Vissing-Jorgensen 2002; Hong, Kubik and Stein 2004; Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz 2008).
In Taiwan, stock-market participation is determined by family wealth, education level and
financial literacy (Hsiao, Chen and Liao 2014). While Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) argue
that social interactions decrease the fixed costs of participating. The connections between
social capital and financial investment in Taiwan have been explored by Lee (2012). Based
on Lin’s (2001) model to estimate the level of social capital, Lee argue individuals with
higher level of social capital (who know people from a wide range of social positions and
from high social status) are more likely to participate in the stock market or mutual funds.
In the 1980s and beyond, the ‘new economic sociology’ offered a valuable explanation of
certain facets of economic action, information distribution and processing, and a refreshing
critique of dominant notions of economic agency. Granovetterian ‘embeddedness’ rapidly
achieved a dominant position in the sociological literature. Nonetheless, it has been
increasingly critiqued for privileging network relations at the expense of analysis of other
sociological phenomena (e.g.Krippner, 2001). In European sociology, two theoretical
innovations gave rise to an interest in the calculative and evaluative performances of market
actors, a program now regularly titled the new, new economic sociology (McFall &
Ossandon, 2014). First of all, Callon (1998), disputing the possibility of both individual
calculation and cultural explanations, sought to focus attention on calculation as ‘embedded’
in theory and distributed across material agencements. For Callon economic action is the
result of an arduous process of configuration and purification. Callon’s innovation has given
rise to a flourishing ‘anthropology of calculation’, particularly of high finance and business.
For example, Mackenzie has examined the calculative agencies of options pricing and
mortgage securitization (MacKenzie, 2006, 2011); Hardie and Mackenzie consider the
calculative anatomy of a hedge fund (Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007), and Beunza and Muniesa
the traders and their ‘spread plot’ (Beunza & Muniesa, 2005). In the world of business,
Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009) argue that business models are intermediary devices
between the entrepreneur, customers, investors, and other actors, while Cabantous and Gond
(2010) demonstrate how rational choice is an organizational achievement, ‘crafted’ by
trained analysts, theory and artefacts. The second theoretical innovation is that offered by
Boltanski and Thevenot (2006), which draws attention to the multiple, and often conflicting
values by which individuals can justify their actions. This ‘French pragmatist’ study of
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creation of opportunity on a trading floor or in a factory (Muniesa, 2011); valuation in life
sciences (Dussauge, Helgesson, Lee, & Woolgar, 2015); or among French funeral directors
(Trompette, 2013).
In short, remarkably few studies tackle the mundane matters of everyday life. There are a few
exceptions. There are several existing studies of non-professional investment, which I shall
return to shortly. Vargha (2011) has documented the interactions between borrowers and
those advising them on loans, following focusing on the modes of calculation and interaction
through which loans are qualified before they are issued. Other studies have focused on the
role of affect, both among everyday economic actors such as debtors (Deville, 2012), and
citizens of high finance, bond traders who must read the yield curve (Zaloom, 2009). These
studies have begun to understand how social interactions, estimates, guesses and
qualifications are written into more disciplined, material calculation, a process that Cochoy
(2008) calls ‘qualculation’.
Zelizer’s (2005, 2012) relational sociology offers a productive conceptualization of social
relations and economic action. Zelizer wishes to move beyond considering how existing
social ties impact economic activity towards a focus on ‘constitutive relations’, namely, the
‘creative effort people make establishing, maintaining, negotiating, transforming, and
terminating interpersonal relations’ (Zelizer, 2012:149). She argues not only that individuals
pursue economic arrangements that reflect and are appropriate to existing interpersonal
relationships, but also that the process of categorisation, or ‘earmarking’ is itself constitutive
of social relations. One of her many examples, of particular relevance to this study, is of the
distinction between a husband’s wheat and corn money, and a wife's egg and butter money in
US farming families in the early 20th century, the former funding mortgages and machinery
and the latter living expenses. As these distinctions persisted, women's earnings from work
was identified as ‘pin money’, and categorised as frivolous and therefore supplementary to,
and less important than, male earnings (ibid.:155). The existence of household or domestic
monies as subsidiary to earnings will play an important role in our analysis. Moreover,
Zelizer cites Randall Collins’ assertion that the structure of social class is the result of a
variety of circuits of money producing particular kinds of social relations, be they the
ownership activities of upper classes, or the illegal monetary circuits of the black market. In a
similar way, Bourdieu (2005) understands economic action as a central part of the
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and status groups in financial markets deploy charismatic authority to bolster and legitimise
their positions.
Developing Zelizer’s concept of earmarking, Poletta and Tufail (2014:5) offer four relational
schemas that shape how people think about money: communal sharing, typical of families;
authority ranking; equality matching, characteristic of acquaintances and colleagues; and
market pricing, where the interaction is reduced to a single metric. Poletta and Tufail suggest
that these schemas are substantial enough to make violation ‘striking’ yet remain enough
ambiguity for actors to engage in relationship work for their own purposes. Their study of
how debt collection agencies make use of moral categorisations to try and encourage
repayment shows clear parallels with Deville’s (2012) work on the collection agencies’
strategic use of affect to increase repayment.
Pursuing a similar line of analysis, Lainer-Vos (2013) suggests that actors, when confronted
by one of the many economic acts in which gift and exchange overlap, generally use
clarification practices to establish whether the act is an instance of gift or market exchange. In
some instances, however, they use blurring practices to avoid these kind of distinctions;
where, as in the case of a moral transaction, ethical and utilities come into contact and
tensions result, actors create a zone of indeterminacy, ‘an institutional context within which
actors can engage each other without sharing a consensus regarding the meaning of the object
that changes hands and the rights and obligations that follow from the exchange’ (ibid.:146).
Of particular relevance to this study, Lainer-Vos identifies loans as a special case of moral
transaction, combining some elements of the gift (such as a time delay on repayment) but
specified in legal terms as an economic exchange. Zelizer (2012) also cites loan contracts
among family members as a means of avoiding the burdens of obligation associated with
gifts. Another relevant example comes from Healy’s (2006) work on organ ‘donation’ shows
the various earmarking and blurring used by policymakers as they seek to incentivize
donations, yet at the same time leave elements of gift and altruism at work in the exchange.
Of particular relevance to our paper is Zelizer’s assertion that some kinds of monetary work
are only possible through a process of earmarking that removes money’s social relations. She
is thinking of the stock market traders studied by Zaloom (2006), who recast money and its
movements as ‘ticks’, separating trading money from personal money, grocery money, and so
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casino or trading screen: they can be gambled, or form the object of speculation, simply
because they are held, or classified, separately from other kinds of money. This is a particular
kind of accounting played out by relational work.
Notwithstanding the importance of such earmarking, the role of social relations in formatting
the decisions of nonprofessional investors within the Anglo-Saxon context seems relatively
undeveloped. Studies of non-professional investors in the UK and America have tended to
show an isolated and lonely occupation. Preda (2009a) records the face to screen ‘brief
encounters’ of individual non-professional investors as they chat through their trades against
the invisible others, just as traders watched by Zaloom (2006) took on the ‘spoofer’. Roscoe
(2013) examines the virtual ‘embeddedness’ of non-professional investors, and shows that
online interactions and relationships are often more important to individuals than the
spectacle of real-world investment performances. Studies of the calculative practices of
nonprofessional investors, for example the ‘chartists’ examined by Mayall (2007, 2008) and
Roscoe and Howorth (2009), also show idiosyncratic modes of investment entangled with
material devices rather than embedded in networks of social relations. Chartists are very
much alone with their machines, caught up in a practice which is difficult to explain to an
outsider (Roscoe & Howorth, 2009). One notable exception is Harrington’s (2007) study of
US investment clubs, which shows investment decisions taken collectively, and largely on the
basis of brand value, rather than investment worthiness. Finally, Roscoe (2014) sees investors
using social spaces, such as investment clubs or exhibitions, to commiserate collectively
about their poor investment performance, and suggests that doing so allows investors a means
of staying in the game in the face of increasing losses.
In summary, existing research on nonprofessional investing paints it as a ‘poor relation’ of
professional investing: while its language and techniques mimic those of high finance, private
participants remain isolated, without status, and frequently unsuccessful. Our study of
Taiwanese non-professional investors, on the other hand, paints a very different picture of a
practice enmeshed in, and constitutive of social relations, among family, friends, and
colleagues. We follow Zelizer’s (2012) lead in examining creativity versus constraints: the
extent to which agents are free to pursue novel relational work, and to which relational
categories are imposed upon them, how ‘certain forms of currency enforce the dependency of
discriminated or subservient populations’ (2012:163). A relational approach can help us
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certainly present, but seem secondary to family ties and trusted information sources, as the
final section of the analysis will make clear. Our data show not so much framing and
purification (Callon, 1998) but entanglement, where, in the words of Wherry (2014: 422),
‘the intertwining of markets and social life results in fundamentally transformed contractual
exchanges’.
Practices and meanings of Taiwanese stock investors
Earmarking trading: games and gossip
Zelizer (2012) notes how in 20th century America women's money, or domestic money, was
categorised as less important than men's money. Stock investing in Taiwan is identified as
domestic, mundane and everyday by its language. It is a universally popular conversational
topic and individuals must become involved in the markets or face social exclusion. Ms Hong
calls stock-trading quanmin yundong (全民運動, a movement for all people) and believes it
is necessary to have some knowledge of the market, ‘otherwise you cannot take part in other
people’s discussions.’ Indeed, stock trading seems to be a most common topic of
conversation among the Taiwanese. Mr Yan says, ‘Everyone [around me] likes to chat about
[stock trading].’ Taiwan’s non-professional stock market participants are known as sanhu,
which is officially translated ‘domestic individual investors’ in surveys and documents1. But
‘traders’ would be a more appropriate word than the term ‘investor’, with its connotations of
long-term holding. Sanhu are by definition small scale, and ordinary. The name sits in
opposition to dahu, (big players) who, the word implies, control a huge amount of trading
capital, and have a much higher status in the market.
The vocabulary of stock market talk earmarks it as domestic and gendered. Ou-Yong uses the
word ‘popomama’ (婆婆媽媽) as the metaphor to describe the feeling of discussing stock
trading with friends and relatives. Popo literally means ‘mother-in-law’, while mama means
‘mother’. Popomama usually means to be ‘fussy’ or ‘emotional’, and carries a stereotypical
1 TWSE Annual Statistics. Available at: http://www.twse.com.tw/en/statistics/statistics.php?tm=07.
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female association. In this context, Ou-Yong means that stock trading discussion amongst
family and friends is equivalent to ‘women’s gossip’:
You can do some research [about the market and talk about it]; or to [tell] some
xiaodao xiaoxi. That feeling is really similar to everyone [in] popomama. Everyone
tells you a ‘mingpai’ [‘a recommended stock’ or stock tip] today. Then, everyone
exchanges information and maintains relations.
‘Stir-frying stock’ (炒股票, chao gupaio), with its connotations of ceaseless activity and
tossing food in the wok, is the most popular slang phrase in China’s stock markets used to
refer to ‘trading stock’ (Gamble 1997; Hertz 1998; interviewing data). ‘Stir-frying stock’ is a
neutral term in China and can be used to describe sanhu’s and dahu’s stock trading.
However, in Taiwan’s stock market, ‘stir-frying stock’ is a negative term which is used by
sanhu to describe the immoral trading or share manipulating strategies of market competitors,
as well as dahu and institutional investors.
The language of investing also evokes the practice’s liminal, though domestic, status in
Taiwan, somewhere between a job and a hobby. Traders were drawn to the social aspects of
the ‘game of investing’. In conversation, ‘doing stock’ (做股票, zuo gupiao) and ‘playing
stock’ (玩股票, wan gupiao) are the most frequently used words to suggest ‘trading stock’.
To ‘do’ (做, zuo) stock (股票, gupiao) is analogous to ‘do’ (做zuo) business (生意, shengyi)
or to ‘do’ (做zuo) work (工作, gongzuo). To ‘play’ (玩, wan) stock (股票, gupiao) is
analogous to ‘play’ (玩, wan) a game (遊戲, youxi). Stock trading is both doing business and
playing games.
Studies of nonprofessional investing in Anglo-Saxon countries have shown a language of
investing keen to identify itself with professional trading in terms of technical vocabulary,
excitement, and unpredictability (Preda, 2009a; Roscoe & Howorth, 2009). In Taiwan, on the
other hand the language of stock market ‘chatter’ is domestic, mundane, and every day,
borrowed from the home and the kitchen. Such a language of investing points to investment
practices embedded in family relationships, and that is indeed the case.
Relational work as a gateway to trading
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a) Success stories
It is clear that social ties do influence trading activity. Equally, relational work is taking place
with charismatic, authority figures persuading individuals to trade and thereby enhancing
their own dominant status and expertise. Trading becomes the vehicle for extending
dominance of existing social relations, in instance of what Bourdieu might term ‘symbolic
violence’. Many nonprofessional investors were attracted to the practice by success stories
told to them by family and friends. As the stock market expanded rapidly in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, so stories of individuals amassing enormous wealth abounded. While such
fairy-tales lacked the credibility needed to inspire potential traders (Wu 2005), interviewees
explained that the visible success of relations, neighbours and friends encouraged them to
begin trading. For example, Mrs Kuo’s brother had been led into trading by the story of a
successful uncle. Mrs Kuo recalls that he planned to imitate one of their uncles, who had
earned a lot of money by trading stock, and had made enough money to buy a property in
central Taipei, an unusual but impressive story that took place before the stock market
explosion of the 1980s. Mrs Kuo’s brother believed that he could copy this model and
become as rich as their uncle.
Ms Zeng, a retired civil servant, began stock trading 26 years ago, encouraged by a neighbour
who portrayed herself as a successful example of the stock trader. One day, this neighbour
said to her, ‘You are too poor, so you have to do stock trading.’ At that time, her neighbour
had purchased two houses with money made on the stock market (moving stock market
profits into property is a common strategy in Taiwan). ‘I told her that I don’t know how to
buy [stock],’ Ms Zeng says, ‘I didn’t know how it [stock trading] could make a profit.’
Following her neighbour’s suggestion, Ms Zeng mortgaged her house and used the money to
trade stock.
Success stories have a long life, even if they do not lead at once the stock market. Mr He had
planned to participate in the stock market for years, ever since he had studied at graduate
school:
At that time in the past, when the VIA [a listed company] was the ‘king of shares’
[the highest price stock in the market], [the share price] was growing to over 600
dollars [NT$]; [it was in] our college period. I had a friend in the graduate school
who had staked on the VIA since [his] time in college. The result was that he
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earned four years’ tuition fees. All [money] were taken back by that [that is, the
person earned the same amount of money as the tuition fees by trading the VIA
shares]. It seems incredible that [his] graduate school tuition fees were
‘sponsored’ by the VIA as well.
Once he had begun working and had saved up some capital, Mr He entered the stock market.
b) Access to friend and status groups
The relational perspective shows social relations being made and developed through
economic actions. As stock trading became widespread and normalised, so it began to serve
as a gateway to peer and status groups. Many interviewees told us that they were involved in
the stock market because they followed their peers: Mr Yang, a newly-retired and bored
junior high school head-teacher, took up trading for entertainment and the company of his
friends who traded. A-Zhen, a tea retailer, had saved money in order to purchase a flat, but
she changed her mind and instead put the money into the stock market; her close friends were
trading and she thought they could analyse the market and trade stock together. In the end A-
Zhen and her friends incurred substantial losses trading. Mr Yang and A-Zhen are blurring
distinctions between economic activity and friendship, the latter with unfortunate
consequences.
Although widespread, trading may be seen as a high status activity, and an essential
economic competency among the well-educated. Mr Yan began stock trading when he was
22 years old, in the year he entered postgraduate school at the top research institute for
electrical and communication engineering in Taiwan. Most of Mr Yan’s classmates and
seniors had gained their undergraduate degree from this school. According to Mr Yan’s
description, his ‘pure-blood’ classmates, who had studied as both undergraduates and
postgraduates in this school, thought themselves to be excellent in everything, including stock
trading. They also had professional knowledge of IT and electrical manufacture, which could
be used to analyse the IT and electrical industries’ market cycles. Trading stock was a part of
the school culture. ‘All [the students] in the postgraduate school were investing [trading
stock]’, Mr Yan says, ‘All [the people] in the postgraduate school [and] in [my] office were
buying stock.’ Mr Yan was one of a few students who had graduated from less prestigious
universities, and was initially excluded from the group. Stock trading became a means for the
young man to integrate into the student community, and trading profits translated into
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prestige and status. Mr Yan put much effort into obtaining good returns, especially after some
substantial early setbacks in his trading.
c) Family and education
Stock trading’s standing in Taiwan as a productive, entertaining and perhaps respectable
pastime is emphasised by the extent to which it has become part of family life. It forms the
basis for conversations between parents and siblings, as a family entertainment and a parental
lesson. In other words, while stock-trading may be a movement for people, it also becomes
part of the essential reproduction of social class. Wealthy families provide small, but not
insignificant, amounts of capital for their children to learn trading, and pass on unused
brokerage accounts. Stock trading appears to be part of the essential repertoire of the
economically literate individual, part of ‘life’, or ‘business’. Cong-Ying, a master’s student,
describes the influence of his family on learning to ‘play’ with stocks and ‘touch’ the market:
It [trading stock] happened naturally, because my family are ‘playing’ [trading
stock]. Father and mother are ‘playing’ [stock]. Besides, my junior brother is
studying finance in [his] postgraduate [and college]. It became three people at
home are ‘touching’ [involved in stock trading] It would be [weird] … if I had
not ‘touched’ it. [Being] influenced gradually, I [decided to] ‘play’ [stock] with
them.
For many, the first glimpse of trading comes from observing parents. During his junior and
high school period, Mr Liu watched his father browsing the stock-trading websites, and often
discussed trading with his father. When he entered college, his father accompanied him to a
brokerage office to open an account into which he deposited NT$50,000 (US$1,700), and
told him that the money was lent to him solely for trading stock. After a period of time, he
felt the money was not enough and asked his father to ‘lend’ him another 50,000. In an
example of blurring gift and exchange relations, as well as a well-developed habitus, Mr Liu
remarks that it seemed very ‘natural’ for Mr Liu to ask his father to provide him the trading
capital after many years of talking about trading.
This economic-status discourse persists over time. In our study we have an instance of it
crossing three generations despite an early financial catastrophe. Sometimes this family
culture succeeds in crossing three generations. Yi-Hong is a college-student investor. His
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mother is a homemaker investor who watches real-time stock market information on
television at home every weekday. In his home, not only his parents, but also his grandfather,
were traders. He still remembers stock charts piled always on the top of his grandfather’s
desk when he was a child. His grandfather had been a big player at that time, but lost almost
all his money in a market crash. After that, his grandfather has rarely touched stock, but the
trading culture still remains in his family. At the end of his first year of college, Yi-Hong
decided to begin stock trading. However, he did not have any capital and hesitated to tell his
parents about his intentions. At that time, he wasn’t sure if his parents would support him, not
least because of his grandfather’s huge loss in the stock market. It took Yi-Hong several
months to confess to his parents. In order to convince them about his resolution and trading
capability, for three months he had practiced simulated trading on paper, sharpening his
‘sense’ of the market. Only then, in a chat with his parents, he casually asked ‘Do you think
it’s a good time to do some stock trading?’ The result was unexpected: his parents’ attitudes
were very positive. They immediately gave him a brokerage account which was owned by his
father, but had not been used for a while. The account still had around NT$30,000 (around
US$1,000), which he used as his original capital for stock trading.
In another example of blurring between social mores and economic activity, Zhi-Chun started
to trade stock when she began to work as a cabin crew member, a job in which it is usual to
have days off during the week. Her mother suggested that Zhi-Chun take up stock trading, so
that her spare time should not be wasted: stock trading would be a productive use of that
time. Zhi-Chun’s mother and her husband gave their daughter NT$100,000 (around
US$3,350) as the starting capital, giving her not only a moral imperative but also economic
support. Ms Wu summed up the ideas on the economic and social importance of trading: ‘no
matter early or late, stock trading is necessary to learn in everyone’s life.’ Stock trading is
seen as an essential skill of economic life, part of the education must be passed to children,
and a productive pastime that crosses gender and generation in the household. Perhaps it is
not surprising that trading has much potential for division within the family.
Family politics and secret savings
Our study shows relational work among investors as strategies of earmarking, blurring, and
clarification are used to avoid conflict. For example, trading often became entangled with
other aspects of family politics. Ou-Yang’s mother deposited money in Ou-Yang’s bank
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account, and asked her daughter to use this money as the original capital to do some
investment on her behalf. Although Ou-Yang had never studied business and finance, and her
job was not connected to commerce, she is the closest person to her mother in the family. The
mother also implied that the main profit of the investment could be freely used by Ou-Yang,
if she was successful in stock trading. It meant that the mother provided the capital and took
the risk of capital loss, but that her daughter would earn the profit. In other words, this was a
covert action of gifting money. However, Ou-Yang’s mother always claimed that Ou-Yang is
only helping to manage her wealth. The blurring strategy avoided Ou-Yang’s sister’s jealousy
and any potential tension between the sisters.
In another, more complex, instance of entangling and blurring relational schemas, Mr Zhan
also opened a brokerage account for his mother in his own name. Her brother had advised the
family to buy shares in a company with which he was connected: ‘[T]he money was provided
by a parent [his mother],’ he says, ‘the parent bought [stock through the account registered in
his name].’ For Mr Zhan’s mother and the other relatives, it seemed an assured opportunity to
make a profit (it is possible that this was insider information – the interviewee does not
explain the reason explicitly), ‘So, everybody bought the stock.’ The mother, a senior official,
did not already have her own stock account and at the time, and was too busy to handle the
‘triviality’ of this trading, including going the brokerage firm to open an account and buying
and selling the stock herself. Mr Zhan ‘had to’ be his mother’s ‘agent’, and trade the stock in
his own name. After his mother took back the capital and profit, Mr Zhan kept the account
open and started his ‘own’ stock trading. It does seem, however, that Mr Zahn took on some
responsibility, and became implicated in this trading while his mother, who could disentangle
and clarify relations if needed, was shielded from any consequences.
Earmarking and occasion strategies may serve to avoid tensions by insisting on the separation
of economic activity from social relations. Family members are usually thought to be close,
but some interviewees were uncomfortable talking about stock trading at home. One clear
reason for people’s reluctance to discuss stock trading within the family circle is the desire to
avoid a family quarrel. As Mr Yang says:
‘[I] don’t talk about stock [trading] with [my] child either. He thinks he knows better
than me. Your generation knows [how to use a] computer, [but] I don’t. Knowing
[how to use a] computer does not ensure [that you will] win [in the stock market].
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Sheng-Ji and his wife are both investors but they have different principles of stock trading.
They do not discuss each other’s trading strategies. Sheng-Ji says:
She buys some [stocks]. She buys her own. She is inclined to listen [to other people’s
information] and follow. I don’t like that … Following other people means she does
not have confidence [in her own judgement]. Listening to other people asking other
people which one [she] should buy means she does not have confidence and [she]
could not make money.
Shen-Ji clearly disagrees with his wife’s principles of stock trading and thinks his own
strategies and performance of stock trading are better, but he does not want his opinion lead
to arguments. For him, the best way to avoid a quarrel is to avoid talking about stock trading
at home.
The other reason for lay investors’ reluctance to discuss trading within the family home is
related to secrecy regarding personal savings. In Taiwan, personal savings which are
unknown to other family members is called ‘sifangqian’ (私房錢). The idea of sifangqian
originates from the Taiwanese traditional idea of the family economy. Traditionally, a family
was an economic unit, and each person’s savings was considered to be part of the family’s
wealth and should be used for the family’s benefit. Therefore, many people were inclined to
have their private and secret savings of which other family members were unaware. If other
family members discovered the secret saving’s existence, they might demand that the savings
be handed over for the family’s use. In the past, especially, the husband controlled the
family’s economic resources and budget, so the wife would have sifangqian for herself.
Nowadays, sifangqian remains in some form in many Taiwanese families, and both husbands
and wives may have sifangqian. For some investors, money for trading stock is a part of their
sifangqian, and so rarely discussed. Ms. Qiu’s family is an example. All her family members
know the others are trading stock, but they do not discuss this issue at home:
My father plays a lot [in the stock market] … Indeed, he has never told [us] when
every time he plays … He has not discussed these kind of questions with me.
Probably, he does not want me or my mother to know the cash flow of his money …
Our family members seldom ask [each other about the situation of each other’s stock
trading]… It seems that [each family member] does not want another [family
member] to know [the detail of their sifangqian].
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A final reason why investors do not talk about their activities is that they do not want others
to know if they lose money in the stock market. Our interviews contain evidence that they are
worried they will lose ‘face’ in front of friends, relatives and acquaintances. As the examples
above imply, ability in stock trading implies intelligence and capability more generally; if one
loses money in the stock market, the implication is that one is a person of inferior abilities.
For example, A-Liang admitted in our interview that he lost a huge amount, around NT$60
million (around US$2.4 million), in the stock market. He emphasizes that most of his investor
friends would never reveal their losses to unfamiliar people, because they care about their
‘face’. However, due to our guanxi (he is a family friend) he was willing to talk about his loss
openly. Mrs Kuo also knows that some of her friends have lost a lot of money in the stock
market, but they still ‘pretend’ that their trading performances are good in front of distant
acquaintances. Mrs Kuo thinks these friends ‘love ‘face’ more than other things’. Finally, Mr
Yan concealed early losses from his fellow students as he was seeking to use his trading skills
as a means of joining a high-status group. There are interesting comparisons to be made with
the UK investors, who, while acting in them as part individually, use collective
commiseration as a means of dealing with losses (Roscoe, 2014). For these investors,
commiseration allows blame to be placed elsewhere, on market others or bad luck, and the
investor to emerge undiminished. In Taiwan, on the other hand, more collectively orientated
investors deal with their losses in private, as a means of protecting their esteem among
colleagues.
The knowledgeable friend: relational work and inside information
Family and friendship ties gave investors access to one particularly important kind of
information: xiaoxi (消息). The term, which literally translates as ‘information’, usually
refers to the latest, or unpublished, unreleased, or unconfirmed information (sometimes
simply rumours) of listed companies’ operations, industries, markets, government policies
and market corners (for example, share-price-manipulation). Mr Yan gives an example of the
circulation of xiaoxi in Taiwan’s stock market:
‘In [20]07, I knew Shan-Zhu. While I was in graduate school, my trading had not
been successful. During that period [in graduate school], I was not good at buying
stock. Shan-Zhu said [he would] help me. At that time, his girlfriend and the people
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around him all said ‘his investment [trading strategy] is not an easy way to make
money’, so they had reservations. However, in that time, the items [shares] which he
recommended … [He] seemed to [be able to] freeze water by words. What he said
would be that [true]. Immediately, [my money] increased from more than [NT$] 5
million [around US$150,000] to more than [NT$] 9 million [around US$280,000]. At
best, it was over [NT$] 11 million. He was incredible. [Every time] I called [him] to
ask which share is better, and then [the share price] would directly hit the limit-up
[daily 7 per cent from the last-trading-day closure price] on the second day. The
situation had lasted 3–4 months. During that time, I felt he was like a god. In the best
situation, it could grow over four columns [reaching the daily limit-up for more than
four days]. I didn’t use margin buying at that time, just bought shares [with my own
money]. BOM! BOM! BOM! [The money] increased by one million in a month. [It
was] really incredible.’
Mr Yan’s story, which ends in heavy losses, is not unusual in the interviews, and shares a
number of characteristics with other accounts of xiaoxi. First of all, investors usually do not
know the sources of their informants’ information. In Mr Yan’s case, it was difficult to
confirm the source of Shan-Zhu’s information: the constantly moving prices suggest that he
was receiving information on a dahu’s share-price manipulation; stock corners by dahu, are
very common in China’s stock markets and futures markets (Hertz 1998; Siu 2010). In
Taiwan’s stock market, information or share price manipulation is called ‘neixian xiaoxi’ (內
線消息), usually shortened to ‘neixian’ (內線.
According to the interviews, when investors are given neixian from someone else they rarely
probe the information’s ‘original source’, presuming that the ‘original source’ is a valuable
secret of the informant. Neixian reflects the charismatic authority and legitimacy accrued by
certain figures in the market. Moreover, as additional buying tightens liquidity and increases
profits for those behind the corner, neixian increase the dominance of certain market actors at
the expense of others. When the neixian seems very ‘sensitive’ (that is, when the revelation
of the information is possibly against relevant regulations), the information receivers are
aware that they should not actively pursue the source’s identity. They prefer to trust
information they are handed by close friends or family members.
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For example, Ms Qiu, whose strategy is based on the following her friend’s
recommendations, has never asked about the source of information. She assumes that her
friend obtains the information because she ‘seemingly knows some friends who play [a]
‘larger’ [amount]’ (that is, they trade a large amount of money in the stock market). Zhi-Chun
often receives ‘useful’ trading information from her uncle. She has no idea who is the original
source of her uncle’s information, but ‘all [information] is very useful’, she says. ‘So I think
this thing [the way information is transmitted] must be that dahu know [the information first]
and then [they] reveal it to some xiaohu [small players, sanhu] who have some guanxi [social
connections with them, like her uncle].’ In Wu’s (2005: 138) study of the mechanism of
informational transmission in Taiwan’s stock market, he also argues that market information
(which is not specified) is transmitted/flows in one direction, from dahu to sanhu.
In September 1988, Financial Minister Kuo, Wan-Rong announced that the government
would restore capital gains tax for securities trading in the following year. After the
announcement, share prices in Taiwan’s stock market fell continuously for 19 days and
thousands of investors demonstrated against this new ruling. Hours before the announcement,
however, Mrs Kuo got a call:
A daka [大咖, an important person, meaning ‘dahu’ in this context] told me, ‘run out
[and sell] half [of the shares] first. Something’s already [happened].’ [I thought] can
any important incident happen?...I said ‘ok, ok, ok,’ [on the phone]. I immediately
went to clear [sell shares] at that time.
According to the conversation, even the informant himself was not sure how the market
would react after the policy announcement. In that time, Mrs Kuo had no idea of the reason,
the context and the ‘original source’ of the information. However, she still followed the
advice to make a crucial decision, selling half of her holding shares immediately without
concern for the price. Her trust in this person, a familiar dahu, overcame any suspicion in her
mind.
Neixian always remains uncertain. Even information from a long-term reliable informant can
be wrong sometimes. For Mr Yan, whose story ended in heavy losses, the one accurate
neixian became seriously misleading. In general, the interviewees agree neixian could be very
useful, but are cautious nonetheless. Both Mrs Kuo and Ms Zeng stated that some of their
friends were ‘tripped up’ in the market due to inaccurate neixian. A number of other
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interviewees also told us that they have heard a similar story, with the common theme that, as
Mrs Huang says, ‘the informant only calls the follower to hop on the bus, but the informant
never reminds the follower when to hop off the bus.’ One suspects that the dahu stepped off
the bus some time before; once again, these accounts can be usefully read as strategies for the
reinforcement of dominant social relations, power and economic capital in market situations.
Discussion
Existing research provides some explanations for the high rates of participation in stock
trading in Taiwan. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) argue social interactions are helpful to
decrease the fixed costs of participating in the stock market in two ways: observational
learning or information sharing; and the enjoyment that people get from talking about the
market together. Lee (2012) suggests that high level of social capital might help individuals
to access professional information and the information might motivate individuals to engage
in financial-market investment. According to Barber and Odean’s (2001) theory, men are
more overconfident and thus they trade more actively and are more likely to engage in stock
markets. However, both Kuo, Kuo, Chiu and Fan’s (2005) and Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean’s
(2008) studies find Taiwanese women trade less aggressively but are more likely to
participate in the stock market
Our study supports and develops these conjectures. Learning models, information and
enjoyment of talking are certainly incentives to engage in stock markets. Our data suggest
that the structure of women’s social interactions in Taiwan, with investing positioned as
‘popomama’, might encourage women to actively participate in the stock market in order to
chat with their female relatives and friends. Personal recommendations and visible success of
friends and families, as well as ‘inside’ information (neixian) encourage newcomers to
participate in the market. Money, group identity, moral support, honour and community
culture also motivate individuals to participate in stock markets. On the other hand, the
negative side of the information afforded by social networks should not be ignored. Even
financial professionals might provide inappropriate trading suggestions to their families and
friends. Inaccurate information can cause huge trading losses and might hurt the relationship
between the informants and the receiver. Indeed, information-sharing can be seen to stop
between close family ties. Investors might keep silent about stock trading in front of their
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family, friends or acquaintances in order to avoid family conflict, keep secret saving or
restrain the possibility of offering inaccurate trading suggestions to others.
At the same time, the richness of social relations and causal mechanisms evident in the data
demands a deeper explanation than social networks. It is clear that the activity of trading is,
as Zelizer (2014) might suggest, constitutive of social relations: individuals use economic
relations – in this case trading, money and related activities. Zelizer argues that ‘earmarking’,
classificatory strategies are central to building social relations. Our study shows these
earmarking processes at work. First of all, stock-trading – and therefore money, time and
activities associated with it – is earmarked as communal, collective and domestic, and
therefore embedded in that sphere. It is quanmin yundong or a movement for all people. It is
described as a game, playful, even as cooking (chao gupaio, or stir frying stock). Parents
earmark small, though not insignificant, sums of money in trading accounts, explicitly to help
their children gain experience of trading in the markets. Earmarking identifies the money as
being losable, part of the costs of education, and classifies any winnings as a reward for hard
study. Sifangqian, or secret savings, are a means of earmarking money away from collective
family arrangements. At a more general level, the discourses on language surrounding stock-
trading position it, and the money involved, as less important than earned income. As the
example of air stewardess Zhi Chung shows, trading is something that is done in one's spare
time. Zelizer also notes, citing Zaloom’s (2006) study of professional traders, that stock-
trading (like casino gambling) is only possible when the ‘persistent personal markers’
(Zelizer, 2012:157) of money have been removed. Earmarking processes are at work so that
money raised from a mortgage, or repurposed from savings for a deposit on a flat can be
moved into the market despite the clear risks involved.
Lainer-vos (2013) suggests that individuals may use ‘blurring’ strategies to negotiate
transactions that are simultaneously economic exchange and gifts. Stock trading is embedded
within the social relations of friendship and family, but at the same time an explicitly
economic transaction. Relational work around trading depends upon blurring of certain
categories. For a start, the language of investing does not make clear whether it is a business
or a game: doing stock’ (做股票, zuo gupiao) and ‘playing stock’ (玩股票, wan gupiao). It is
trade, and gossip. Trading entangles friendship and economic activity: consider A-Zhen, who
takes her savings and begins to trade so that she can keep her friends company, although
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eventually all of the women suffer heavy losses. Trading is educational, as the deposits made
by parents show, but at the same time it is connected with economic status, general ability,
and access to privileged groups. Mr Yan became a trader to gain access to an elite group at
his university; Yan and others are unwilling to admit losses because trading skill is perceived
to be a marker of more general intellectual or personal ability. Ou-Yang’s example – ‘looking
after’ funds deposited by her mother in an account bearing Ou-Yang’s name – blurs the
distinction between a gift and economic stewardship; Mr Zahn, on the other hand, in opening
an account for his mother to trade on inside information potentially opens himself to
prosecution by carrying out his mother's trading. On other occasions, however, conflict
around investing is obviated by ‘clarifying’ stock trading as a purely economic activity:
households who avoid market conversation between family members do exactly this,
positioning it beyond the boundaries of the family to avoid conflict.
It is also possible to discern particular relational schemas at work organising and
underpinning the social relations of stock trading in Taiwan (Polletta & Tufail, 2014). For the
most part, stock trading is located within a ‘communal sharing’ mode, associated with family
and friendship. Social connections, investing with friends and alongside parents, a language
of participation and easy-going chatter all point towards this schema. On the other hand, an
authority schema is also in evidence, with advice coming from successful, often older
relations, colleagues and friends. Status groups impose investing ability as a prerequisite for
entry, while the neixian described in the final section depend upon unquestioning acceptance
of opinions and titbits from dahu. The charismatic authority deployed by high status actors to
support their own position (Preda, 2009b) is evident throughout. There are parallels here with
the multiple modes of evaluation suggested by Boltanski and Thevenot (2006); the
investment activities within families, for example, correspond to the ‘figures’ Boltanski and
Thevenot posit for the domestic world, such as family ceremonies, and conversation.
Relationships of persuasion, influence, recognition and visibility correspond with Boltanski
and Thevenot’s world of fame, and can be identified in the account given by Mrs Kuo of how
a rich uncle led her brother to stock-trading.
Notions of status, fame and charismatic authority encourages to follow Zelizer’s lead, and to
consider how ‘certain forms of currency enforce the dependency of discriminated or
subservient populations’ (2012:163). There are numerous examples in our study. For
example, it is recognised that middle class parents, anxious to prepare their children for life in
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a world of increased competition, ‘invest significant resources in supplemental education and
extracurricular activities that they view as essential to ensuring reproduction of their class’
(Lamont, 2012:202). For wealthy Taiwanese families, learning to trade stock is an essential
aspect of education and economic development. These deposits become an instance of class
divisions being perpetuated in monetary circuits. Bourdieu’s (2005) classical analysis of
economic habitus sees it as a means of preserving class and power distinctions, as higher
status actors within fields work to preserve their position relative to others. Neixian, unnamed
and unreliable inside information stemming from dahu or other high status actors, is
seemingly implicated in the exploitation of non-professional investors in share corners and
manipulations. In other instances, such as the case of Mrs Kuo’s timely avoidance of an
infamous stock market crisis, the existence of well-placed friends confers substantial
advantages over those less fortunate.
Callon’s (1998) anthropology of calculation directs our attention to calculative agencements
and at the devices which support individual decision. In our account, devices are in the
background – Yi-Hong remembers the charts piled up on his grandfather's desk. Mr Liu,
whose father set him up with a trading account and replenished the capital, often saw his
father browsing the stock-trading websites at home. He joined internet forums, bought stock-
investing magazines, and watched stock analysis programmes on television: ‘Through these
[channels], I partially understood some probably right or wrong theories [about stock
trading],’ he says (our italics). Mr Liu’s final comment suggests that in the context of Taiwan
these media channels and the accompanying devices are relatively unimportant, compared
with sources of neixian. Here, the picture of stock-trading in Taiwan is remarkably different
from accounts of Anglo-Saxon lay-investors, where interpersonal relationships take second
place to the material, calculative agencements of individual investors (Mayall, 2006; Roscoe
& Howorth, 2009). While it may be trite to reduce the discussion to a Hofstede-(1980) style
distinction of collective versus individual culture, there are marked differences between the
role of interpersonal relationships among lay-investors in Taiwan and, for example, the
United Kingdom.
In conclusion, our study contributes to the growing recognition that mundane social relations
must be written into the sociology of economic activity (Moor & Lury, 2011). We have
examined the practices and meanings of lay-stock investing in Taiwan in order to elaborate
on the calculative practices of individual investors. We have considered existing literature
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that has investigated the Granovetterian (1973) embeddedness of investment in social
relations. We have found these explanations to be superficial, although not inaccurate.
Following more recent sociological investigations of economic activity, we have considered
stock-trading from the perspective of a ‘relational sociology’and have suggested that stock
investing is constitutive of social relations, of ‘establishing, maintaining, negotiating,
transforming, and terminating interpersonal relations’ (Zelizer, 2012:149).
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